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We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can
be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between
subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential
ingredient of the proposed deﬁnition is the qualitative notion of AGM-
consistency, which has an epistemic justiﬁcation based on the AGM theory
of belief revision.
Keywords: belief revision, plausibility order, consistency, subgame-perfect
equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, Bayesian updating.
1 Introduction
Attempts to reﬁne the notion of Nash equilibrium in extensive-form (or dy-
namic) games must deal with the issue of belief revision: how should a player
revise her beliefs when informed that she has to make a choice at an informa-
tion set to which she initially assigned zero probability? Kreps and Wilson [8]
suggested the notion of assessment as a way of expressing the players’ beliefs
during an arbitrary play of the game. An assessment is a pair (σ, ) where
σ is a strategy proﬁle and   a “system of beliefs”, deﬁned as a collection of
probability distributions, one for every information set, over the nodes in that
information set. The system of beliefs   speciﬁes a player’s beliefs about past
moves, while the strategy proﬁle σ provides the initial beliefs as well as beliefs
∗A ﬁrst draft of this paper was presented at the the ninth conference on Logic and the
Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decision (LOFT9), Toulouse, July 2010 and at the
Workshop on Epistemic Game Theory, SUNY Stony Brook, July 2010.
1about future moves of the opponents conditional on every node. Given the sep-
arate roles played by σ and   in specifying players’ beliefs, it is necessary to
impose some requirement of compatibility between the two. Kreps and Wilson
proposed the notion of “consistency”, which we will call KW-consistency. An




of completely mixed strategy proﬁles such that, letting  m be the unique system
of beliefs associated - using Bayes’ rule - to σm, limm→∞(σm, m) = (σ, ). A
number of authors have tried to shed light on this topological notion by relat-
ing it to more intuitive concepts, such as ‘structural consistency’ ([9]), ‘generally
reasonable extended assessment’ ([5]), ‘stochastic independence’ ([2, 7]).1 Kreps
and Wilson then proceeded to deﬁne a sequential equilibrium as an assessment
which is KW-consistent and sequentially rational.2 In applications, however,
checking the KW-consistency requirement has proved to be rather complex and
simpler notions of equilibrium have been sought. A drastic simpliﬁcation is the
notion of weak sequential equilibrium ([10], p. 170), which is deﬁned as a sequen-
tially rational assessment (σ, ) where the beliefs expressed by   are obtained
using Bayes’ rule at all the information sets that are reached by σ with positive
probability (while no restrictions are imposed on the beliefs at information sets
that are not reached by σ). However, this notion is too weak in the sense that
(σ, ) can be a weak sequential equilibrium without σ being a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.3 Thus attempts have been made to ﬁnd an intermediate notion
between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium incorporating
a simpler requirement than KW-consistency. Such an intermediate notion was
proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole [5] and called perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Unfortunately this new notion was deﬁned only for a small subset of extensive-
form games (namely the class of multi-stage games with observed actions) and
extending it to arbitrary games proved to be diﬃcult.
In this paper we propose a new intermediate notion between subgame-perfect
equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, which - in order to avoid introducing
a new expression - we will also call perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The advan-
tages of this equilibrium concept are that (1) it is a general notion that can
be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and (2) its main ingredient is a
purely qualitative condition - we call it “AGM-consistency” - which is simple,
easy to verify and a generalization of KW-consistency. An assessment (σ, )
is AGM-consistent if there is a total pre-order ￿ on the set of histories H -
which we call a plausibility order - such that: (1) for every information set I
the histories that are assigned positive probability by   are precisely those that
are most plausible in I and (2) at every information set I the choices that are
assigned positive probability by σ are precisely those that “preserve plausibil-
1Perea et al [13] oﬀer an algebraic characterization of consistent assessments.
2All the deﬁnitions will be spelled out in detail later. Sequential rationality requires, for
every information set, that the choice prescribed by the relevant component of σ be optimal
given the corresponding player’s beliefs at that information set.
3A strategy proﬁle σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if, for every subgame, the restriction
of σ to the subgame yields a Nash equilibrium of the subgame. The notion of subgame-perfect
equilibrium was introduced by Selten [15].
2ity”, in the sense that if h is a history in I and a is a choice at h then ha is as
plausible as h. An attractive feature of the notion of AGM-consistency is that it
has an independent epistemic justiﬁcation based on the so called AGM theory
of belief revision introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1]. Be-
cause of space limitations we leave the discussion of the epistemic foundations
of AGM-consistency to a companion paper ([4]).
We deﬁne an assessment (σ, ) to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is
AGM-consistent, sequentially rational and the probabilities speciﬁed by   are
compatible with Bayes’ rule. We show that if (σ, ) is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium then σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium and that the set of sequential
equilibria is a proper subset of the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria.
2 Extensive forms, assessments and KW-consistency
We shall use the history-based deﬁnition of extensive-form game (see, for ex-
ample, [12]). If A is a set, we denote by A∗ the set of ﬁnite sequences in A.
If h =  a1,...,ak  ∈ A∗ and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the sequence h′ =  a1,...,aj  is called
a preﬁx of h. If h =  a1,...,ak  ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A, we denote the sequence
 a1,...,ak,a  ∈ A∗ by ha.





• A ﬁnite set of actions A.
• A ﬁnite set of histories H ⊆ A∗ which is closed under preﬁxes (that is, if
h ∈ H and h′ ∈ A∗ is a preﬁx of h, then h′ ∈ H). The null history   ,
denoted by ∅, is an element of H and is a preﬁx of every history. A history
h ∈ H such that, for every a ∈ A, ha / ∈ H, is called a terminal history. The
set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. Let D = H \ Z denote the set of
non-terminal or decision histories. For every history h ∈ H, we denote by
A(h) the set of actions available at h, that is, A(h) = {a ∈ A : ha ∈ H}.
Thus A(h)  = ∅ if and only if h ∈ D. We assume that A =
 
h∈D A(h)
(that is, we restrict attention to actions that are available at some decision
history).
• A ﬁnite set N = {1,...n} of players. In some cases there is also an addi-
tional, ﬁctitious, player called chance.
• A function P : D → N ∪ {chance} that assigns a player to each decision
history. Thus P(h) is the player who moves at history h. A game is
said to be without chance moves if P(h) ∈ N for every h ∈ D. For every
i ∈ N ∪ {chance}, let Di = P−1(i) be the histories assigned to player
i. Thus {Dchance,D1,...,Dn} is a partition of D. We follow Kreps and
Wilson [8] in assuming that chance moves occur at most at the beginning
of the game, that is, either Dchance = ∅ or Dchance = {∅} (recall that ∅
denotes the null history). If ∅ is assigned to chance, then a probability
distribution over A(∅) is given that assigns positive probability to every
a ∈ A(∅).
3• For every player i ∈ N, ≈i is an equivalence relation on Di. The interpre-
tation of h ≈i h′ is that, when choosing an action at history h ∈ Di, player
i does not know whether she is moving at h or at h′. The equivalence class
of h ∈ Di is denoted by Ii(h) and is called an information set of player
i; thus Ii(h) = {h′ ∈ Di : h ≈i h′}. The following restriction applies:
if h′ ∈ Ii(h) then A(h′) = A(h), that is, the set of actions available to a
player is the same at any two histories that belong to the same information
set of that player.
• The following property, known as perfect recall, is assumed: for every
player i ∈ N, if h1,h2 ∈ Di, a ∈ A(h1) and h1a is a preﬁx of h2 then for
every h′ ∈ Ii(h2) there exists an h ∈ Ii(h1) such that ha is a preﬁx of h′.
Intuitively, perfect recall requires a player to remember what she knew in
the past and what actions she took previously.4
Given an extensive form, one obtains an extensive game by adding, for every
player i ∈ N, a utility (or payoﬀ ) function Ui : Z → R (where R denotes the
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An extensive form without chance moves
Figure 1
Figure 1 shows an extensive form without chance moves where
A = {a,b,s,c,d,e,f,g,h,m,n}, H = D ∪ Z with (to simplify the notation we
write a instead of  ∅,a , ac instead of  ∅,a,c , etc.) D = {∅,a,b,ac,ad,acf,ade,adf},
Z = {s,ace,acfg,acfh,adeg,adeh,adfm,adfn,bm,bn}, A(∅) = {a,b,s}, A(a) =
{c,d}, A(ac) = A(ad) = {e,f}, A(acf) = A(ade) = {g,h}, A(adf) = A(b) =
{m,n}, N = {1,2,3,4}, P(∅) = 1, P(a) = 2, P(ac) = P(ad) = 3, P(acf) =
P(ade) = P(adf) = P(b) = 4, ≈1 = {(∅,∅)}, ≈2 = {(a,a)},
≈3 = {(ac,ac),(ac,ad),(ad,ac),(ad,ad)} and
≈4 = {(acf,acf),(acf,ade),(ade,acf),(ade,ade),(adf,adf),(adf,b),(b,adf),(b,b)}.
4For an investigation of the conceptual content of the property of perfect recall see [3].
4The information sets containing more than one history (for example, I4(b) =
{adf,b}) are shown as rounded rectangles. The root of the tree represents the
null history ∅.
Notation 1 If h and h′ are decision histories, we write h′ ∈ I(h) as a short-
hand for “h′ ∈ Ii(h) with i ∈ P−1(h)”. Thus h′ ∈ I(h) means that h and h′
belong to the same information set (of the relevant player).
Remark 2 In order to simplify the notation in the proofs, we shall assume that
no action is available at more than one information set: ∀h,h′ ∈ H,∀a ∈ A, if
a ∈ A(h) ∩ A(h′) then h′ ∈ I(h).5
Given an extensive form, a pure strategy of player i ∈ N is a function that
associates with every information set of player i an action at that information
set, that is, a function si : Di → A such that (1) si(h) ∈ A(h) and (2) if
h′ ∈ Ii(h) then si(h′) = si(h). For example, one of the pure strategies of
Player 4 in the extensive form illustrated in Figure 1 is s4(acf) = s4(ade) = g
and s4(adf) = s4(b) = m. A behavior strategy of player i is a collection of
probability distributions, one for each information set, over the actions available
at that information set; that is, a function σi : Di → ∆(A) (where ∆(A) denotes
the set of probability distributions over A) such that (1) σi(h) is a probability
distribution over A(h) and (2) if h′ ∈ Ii(h) then σi(h′) = σi(h). A behavior
strategy proﬁle is an n-tuple σ = (σ1,...,σn) where, for every i ∈ N, σi is a
behavior strategy of player i. Given our assumption that no action is available
at more than one information set, without risking ambiguity we shall denote
by σ(a) the probability assigned to action a by the relevant component of the
strategy proﬁle σ.6 Note that a pure strategy is a special case of a behavior
strategy where each probability distribution is degenerate. A behavior strategy
is completely mixed at history h ∈ D if, for every a ∈ A(h), σ(a) > 0.
For example, in the extensive form of Figure 1 a possible behavior strategy





, which we will more simply denote by s (and
















A system of beliefs, is a collection of probability distributions, one for every
information set, over the elements of that information set, that is, a function
  : D → ∆(H) such that (1) if h ∈ Di then  (h) is a probability distribution
over Ii(h) and (2) if h ∈ Di and h′ ∈ Ii(h) then  (h) =  (h′). Without risking
5See Footnote 17 in the Appendix for an explanation of how the proofs would have to be
written without this convention.
6If h ∈ Di and σi is the ith component of σ, then σi(h) is a probability distribution over
A(h) and if a ∈ A(h) then σi(h)(a) is the probability assigned to action a by σi(h). We denote
σi(h)(a) more simply by σ(a).
5ambiguity we shall denote by  (h) the probability assigned to history h by the
system of beliefs  .7
Note that a completely mixed behavior strategy proﬁle yields, using Bayes’
rule, a unique system of beliefs.
An assessment is a pair (σ, ) where σ is a behavior strategy proﬁle and  
is a system of beliefs. An assessment represents the beliefs of the players: the
strategy proﬁle σ yields the initial beliefs as well as conditional beliefs about the
future, while the system of beliefs   gives conditional beliefs about the past. For





















Player 3. By σ, the initial beliefs of Player 3 (that is, before the game begins)
is that Player 1 will play s and thus the outcome of the game will be z1; in
particular, Player 3 believes that she will not be asked to move. If she were
asked to move, then, by  , she would assign equal probability to the event that
Player 2 chose c and the event that Player 2 chose d and, by σ, she would believe
that her choice of e would lead to either outcome z2 or outcome z4 (with equal
probability) and that her choice of f would lead to either outcome z3 or outcome
z5 (with equal probability).
Given that σ and   play separate roles in the representation of the players’
initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs, it is natural to impose a
requirement of compatibility between the two. Kreps and Wilson [8] proposed
the following notion of compatibility, which they called consistency; we will call





of completely mixed strategy proﬁles such that, letting
 m be the unique system of beliefs associated - using Bayes’ rule - to σm,8
limm→∞(σm, m) = (σ, ).
In this paper we provide an independently motivated and qualitative notion
of compatibility, which we call AGM-consistency, and use it to deﬁne a notion
of equilibrium which is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and
sequential equilibrium.
An epistemic justiﬁcation of the notion of AGM-consistency based on the
AGM theory of belief revision [1] and a more in-depth analysis of the relationship
between AGM-consistency and KW-consistency are provided in a companion
paper ([4]).
7A more precise notation would be  (h)(h): if h ∈ Di then  (h) is a probability distribution
over Ii(h) and, for every h′ ∈ I(h),  (h) =  (h′) so that  (h)(h) =  (h′)(h). With slight
abuse of notation we denote this common probability by  (h).








σm(a), where a ∈ h means that action a
occurs in history h. Since σm is completely mixed, σm(a) > 0 for every a ∈ A.
63 AGM-consistency
Given a set H, a total pre-order on H is a binary relation ￿ ⊆ H × H which
is complete (∀h,h′ ∈ H, either h ￿ h′ or h′ ￿ h) and transitive (∀h,h′,h′′ ∈ H,
if h ￿ h′ and h′ ￿ h′′ then h ￿ h′′).
Deﬁnition 3 Given an extensive form, a plausibility order is a total pre-order
on the set of histories H that satisﬁes the following properties: ∀h ∈ D,
1. h ￿ ha, ∀a ∈ A(h),
2. ∃a ∈ A(h) such that ha ￿ h and,
∀a ∈ A(h), if ha ￿ h then h′a ￿ h′, ∀h′ ∈ I(h).
3. If the empty history ∅ is assigned to chance, then ∀a ∈ A(∅), a ￿ ∅.
If h ￿ h′ we say that history h is at least as plausible as history h′. Property 1
says that adding an action to a history h cannot yield a more plausible history
than h itself. Property 2 says that at every decision history h there is some
action a such that adding a to h yields a history which is at least as plausible
as h and, furthermore, any such action a performs the same role with any other
history that belongs to the same information set. Property 3 says that all the
actions assigned to chance (if any) are “plausibility preserving” (see Remark 4
below).
We write h ∼ h′ (with the interpretation that h is as plausible as h′) as a
short-hand for “h ￿ h′ and h′ ￿ h” and we write h ≺ h′ (with the interpretation
that h is more plausible than h′) as a short-hand for “h ￿ h′ and h′  ￿ h”.
Remark 4 It follows from Property 1 of Deﬁnition 3 that, for every h,h′ ∈ H,
if h′ is a preﬁx of h then h′ ￿ h.9 Furthermore, by Properties 1 and 2, for every
decision history h, there is at least one action a at h such that h ∼ ha, that is,
ha is as plausible as h; furthermore, if h′ belongs to the same information set
as h, then h′ ∼ h′a. We call such actions plausibility preserving.
Deﬁnition 5 Fix an extensive-form. An assessment (σ, ) is AGM-consistent
if there exists a plausibility order ￿ on H such that:
(i) the actions that are assigned positive probability by σ are precisely the
plausibility-preserving actions: ∀h ∈ D,∀a ∈ A(h),
σ(a) > 0 if and only if h ∼ ha, (P1)
(ii) the histories that are assigned positive probability by   are precisely those
that are most plausible within the corresponding information set: ∀h ∈ D,
 (h) > 0 if and only if h ￿ h′,∀h′ ∈ I(h). (P2)
9In fact, if h′ is a preﬁx of h then h = h′a1...am for some (possibly none) a1,...,am ∈ A,
so that, by Property 1, h′ ￿ h′a1 ￿ h′a1a2 ￿ ... ￿ h′a1...am = h and thus, by transitivity of
￿, h′ ￿ h.
7If ￿ satisﬁes properties P1 and P2 with respect to (σ, ), we say that ￿
rationalizes (σ, ).
The notion of AGM-consistency imposes natural restrictions on assessments.
Consider, for example, the extensive form of Figure 2 and any assessment (σ, )
where σ = (c,d,f) (highlighted by double edges) and   assigns positive prob-
ability to history be. Any such assessment is not AGM-consistent. In fact, if
there were a plausibility order ￿ that satisﬁed Deﬁnition 5, then, by P1, b ∼ bd
(since σ(d) = 1 > 0) and b ≺ be (since σ(e) = 0)10 and, by P2, be ￿ bd (since -
by hypothesis -   assigns positive probability to be). By transitivity of ￿, from
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Any assessment (σ, ) where σ = (c,d,f) and   assigns
positive probability to history be is not AGM-consistent.
Figure 2
On the other hand, consider the partial extensive form of Figure 3 (in order
to simplify the ﬁgure, the choices of Player 3 have been omitted) and an arbitrary
assessment of the form (σ, ) where σ = (a,g,r) (highlighted by double edges)
and   assigns positive probability to the black nodes and zero probability to
the gray nodes (thus  (c) =  (e) =  (ch) = 0, while every other history is
assigned positive probability). Any such assessment is AGM-consistent. In fact
it is rationalized by the following plausibility order (h is on the same row as h′
if and only if h ∼ h′ and h is above h′ if and only if h ≺ h′ ):










     

10By deﬁnition of plausibility order, b ￿ be and by P1 it is not the case that b ∼ be because
e is not assigned positive probability by σ. Thus b ≺ be.
8Note that there may be several plausibility orders that rationalize a given
assessment (for instance, an alternative plausibility order to the one given above


















Any assessment (σ, ) where σ = (a,g,r) and   assigns zero
probability to, and only to, histories c, e and ch is AGM-consistent.
Figure 3
Note that, for every extensive form, the set of plausibility orders is non-
empty and, for every plausibility order, there is at least one assessment which
is rationalized by that plausibility order.11
We now show that the notion of AGM-consistency generalizes the notion of
KW-consistency, in the sense that the set of KW-consistent assessments is a
proper subset of the set of AGM-consistent assessments.
Given a plausibility order ￿ on the set of histories H, a function F : H → N
(where N denotes the set of non-negative integers) is an integer-valued represen-
tation of ￿ if F(∅) = 0 (recall that ∅ denotes the null history) and, ∀h,h′ ∈ H,
h ￿ h′ if and only if F(h) ≤ F(h′). Since H is ﬁnite, the set of integer-valued
representations of ￿ is non-empty.12
11If h ∈ Di let σi(h) be an arbitrary probability distribution whose support coincides with
the set of plausibility preserving actions at h and if I is an information set then let   assign
positive probability to all and only the most plausible histories in I.
12A natural integer-valued representation is the following. Deﬁne H0 = {h ∈ H : h ￿
x, ∀x ∈ H}, H1 = {h ∈ H \ H0 : h ￿ x, ∀x ∈ H\H0} and, in general, for every integer
k ≥ 1, Hk = {h ∈ H \ H0∪...∪ Hk−1 : h ￿ x, ∀x ∈ H \ H0∪...∪ Hk−1}. Since H is ﬁnite,
there is an m ∈ N such that {H0,...,Hm} is a partition of H and, for every j,k ∈ N, with
j < k ≤ m, and for every h,h′ ∈ H, if h ∈ Hj and h′ ∈ Hk then h ≺ h′. Deﬁne F : H → N
as follows: F(h) = k if and only if h ∈ Hk. The function F so deﬁned is an integer-valued
representation of ￿.
9Deﬁnition 6 A plausibility order ￿ on the set of histories H is choice-measurable
if it has at least one integer-valued representation F that satisﬁes the following
property: ∀h ∈ D, ∀h′ ∈ I(h), ∀a ∈ A(h),
F(ha) − F(h) = F(h′a) − F(h′). (CM)
Note that not every integer-valued representation of a choice measurable
plausibility order need satisfy Property CM. For example, consider the plau-
sibility order and the two integer-valued representations F1 and F2 shown in
Figure 4a. F1 is the representation described in Footnote 12 and does not
satisfy Property CM, since c ∈ I(b) and F1(bf) − F1(b) = 2 − 1 = 1 while
F1(cf) − F1(c) = 5 − 3 = 2. On the other hand, F2 does satisfy CM.
￿ F1 F2
∅, a 0 0
b, be 1 1
bf 2 3
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(a) A plausibility order (b) An assessment rationalized by
and two integer-valued the choice-measurable plausibility
representations of it. order shown on the left.
Figure 4
The following proposition (which follows from Lemma A.1 in Kreps and
Wilson [8], p. 887) provides a characterization of KW-consistency in terms of
rationalizability by a choice-measurable plausibility order. The proof is given
in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 Fix an extensive form.
(1) If (σ, ) is a KW-consistent assessment then there is a choice-measurable
plausibility order that rationalizes it (and thus (σ, ) is AGM consistent).
(2) Conversely, if ￿ is a choice measurable plausibility order, then there
exists a KW-consistent assessment (σ, ) which is rationalized by ￿.
Proposition 7 makes it easy to check whether an assessment is KW-consistent.
For example, consider again the extensive form of Figure 3 and an arbitrary as-
sessment (σ, ) where σ = (a,g,r) (highlighted by double edges) and   assigns
positive probability to the black nodes and zero probability to the gray nodes
(thus  (c) =  (e) =  (ch) = 0, while every other history is assigned posi-
tive probability). We saw above that any such assessment is AGM-consistent.
10On the other hand, no such assessment is KW-consistent, because there is no
choice-measurable plausibility order that rationalizes it. To see this, let ￿ be a
plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment under consideration and let
F be an arbitrary integer-valued representation of ￿. By P2 of Deﬁnition 5,
es ≺ ch and thus
F(es) < F(ch). (1)
By P1 of Deﬁnition 5, c ∼ cg and e ∼ er and by P2 cg ∼ er. Thus, by
transitivity of ￿, c ∼ e so that F(c) = F(e). Hence, by (1),
F(es) − F(e) < F(ch) − F(c). (2)
Similarly, by P1, b ∼ bg and d ∼ dr and, by P2, bg ∼ dr. Thus, by transitivity
of ￿, b ∼ d so that
F(b) = F(d). (3)
By P2, bh ∼ ds and thus F(bh) = F(ds). Hence, by (3),
F(bh) − F(b) = F(ds) − F(d). (4)
Now, if F(ch)−F(c) = F(bh)−F(b) (as required by Property CM of Deﬁnition
6) then, by (2) and (4), F(es) −F(e) < F(ds) −F(d), violating Property CM.
4 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
We now deﬁne a notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is very general,
in the sense that it can be applied to every ﬁnite extensive-form game.13 The
essential ingredient is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency to which we
add a Bayesian updating requirement for probabilities and sequential rationality.
Given a total pre-order ￿ on H and a subset I ⊆ H we denote by Min￿ I
the set of most plausible histories in I, that is,
Min￿ I = {h ∈ I : h ￿ h′,∀h′ ∈ I}.
Deﬁnition 8 Let ￿ by a plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment
(σ, ). We say that (σ, ) is Bayesian relative to ￿ if for every ￿-equivalence
class E there exists a probability measure νE : H → [0,1] such that:
(i) Supp(νE) = E.
(ii) If h,h′ ∈ E and h is a preﬁx of h′, that is, h′ = ha1...,am, then
νE(h′) = νE(h) × σ(a1) × ... × σ(am).
13Previous deﬁnitions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium were proposed for restricted classes
of extensive-form games (e.g. the class of multi-stage games with observed actions: see [5]).
11(iii) For every information set I such that Min￿I ⊆ E and for every h ∈ I,




Property (i) requires the support of νE to coincide with E (thus νE(x) = 0
if and only if x ∈ H\E). Property (ii) requires νE to be consistent with the
strategy proﬁle σ in the sense that if h′ = ha1...,am then the probability of h′
(according to νE) is equal to the probability of h multiplied by the probabilities
(according to σ) of the actions that lead from h to h′.14 Property (iii) requires
the system of beliefs   to satisfy Bayes’ rule in the sense that if history h
belongs to information set I then  (h) (the probability assigned to h by  ) is
the probability of h conditional on I using the probability measure νE, where
E is the equivalence class of the most plausible elements of I.15
Deﬁnition 9 An assessment (σ, ) is Bayesian AGM-consistent if it is ratio-
nalized by a plausibility order ￿ on the set of histories H and it is Bayesian
relative to ￿.
Consider, for example, the extensive form of Figure 3 and the following
assessment:











Then (σ, ) is rationalized by
￿ =










     

and it is Bayesian relative to ￿: for every ￿-equivalence class E let νE to be
the uniform measure over E. Take, for instance, E = {b,bg,d,dr}. Then νE
assigns probability 1
4 to every element of E and zero to every other history.
Property (ii) of Deﬁnition 8 is satisﬁed, because b,bg ∈ E, b is a preﬁx of bg
and νE(bg) = 1
4 = νE(b) × σ(g) = 1
4 × 1 = 1
4 (and similarly for d and dr).

















As another example, consider the extensive form of Figure 5 and the follow-
ing assessment:
14Note that if h,h′ ∈ E and h′ = ha1...am, then σ(aj) > 0, for all j = 1,...,m. In fact, since
h′ ∼ h every action aj is plausibility preserving and therefore, by Property P1 of Deﬁnition
5, σ(aj) > 0.
15Note that the ￿-equivalence class that contains Min￿ I is not necessarily a subset of I.
For example, if H = {h1,...,h4} and ￿ is given by h1 ≺ h2 ∼ h3 ≺ h4 ∼ h5 and I = {h2,h4}















































A Bayesian AGM-consistent assessment
Figure 5









and it is Bayesian relative to ￿. First of all, note that, letting I2 = {a,bf,bg} be
the information set of Player 2 and I3 = {ad,ae,b} the information set of Player
3, we have that Min￿I2 = I2 and Min￿I3 = {ad,b} and the equivalence class
that contains these two sets is E = {a,b,ad,bf,bg,adf,adg,bfd,bgd}. Then all
we need to specify is a probability measure over E. Let
νE =
 





















Then all the properties of Deﬁnition 8 are satisﬁed. For instance, concerning
Property (ii), b is a preﬁx of bf and νE(bf) = 3
36 = νE(b)×σ(f) = 9
36 × 1
3, and,










The last ingredient of the deﬁnition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the
standard requirement of sequential rationality. An assessment (σ, ) is sequen-
tially rational if, for every player i and every information set Ii of player i,
player i’s expected payoﬀ, given her beliefs at Ii (as speciﬁed by  ) and the
strategy proﬁle σ, cannot be increased by unilaterally changing her choice at Ii
13and possibly at information sets of hers that follow Ii.16 In order to deﬁne se-
quential rationality precisely we need to introduce more notation. Recall that Z
denotes the set of terminal histories and, for every player i, Ui : Z → R denotes
player i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Given a decision history
h, let Z(h) denote the terminal histories which have h as a preﬁx. Let Ph,σ
denote the probability distribution over Z(h) induced by the strategy proﬁle
σ, starting from history h (that is, if z is a terminal history and z = ha1...am
then Ph,σ(z) =
 m







Ph,σ(z)Ui(z) be player i′s expected payoﬀ at Ii if
σ is played, given her beliefs at Ii (as speciﬁed by  ). We say that player i’s
strategy σi is sequentially rational at Ii if ui(Ii|(σi,σ−i), ) ≥ ui(Ii|(τi,σ−i), )
for every strategy τi of player i (where σ−i denotes the strategy proﬁle of the
players other than i, that is, σ−i = (σ1,...,σi−1,σi+1,...,σn)). An assessment
(σ, ) is sequentially rational if, for every player i and for every information set
Ii of player i, σi is sequentially rational at Ii.
Deﬁnition 10 An assessment (σ, ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is
Bayesian AGM-consistent and sequentially rational.
The following propositions are proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 11 If (σ, ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium then σ is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
Note that not every subgame-perfect equilibrium is part of an assessment
which is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. That is, the notion of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is a strict reﬁnement of subgame-perfect equilibrium. This can be
shown with the aid of the extensive form of Figure 2. Turn it into a game by
adding the following payoﬀs:
af ag bdf bdg bef beg c
U1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
U2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
U3 0 2 0 1 1 0 0
Let σ = (c,d,f). Then σ is a Nash equilibrium and thus - since there are no
proper subgames - also a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Add to σ a system of
beliefs   that makes (σ, ) a sequentially rational assessment . Then it must be
that  (be) > 0 (since, for player 3, g is strictly better than f at both history a
and history bd). As showed above, such an assessment is not AGM-consistent.
16There are two deﬁnitions of sequential rationality: the weakly local one - which is the one
adopted here - according to which at an information set a player can contemplate changing
her choice not only there but possibly also at subsequent information sets of hers and a strictly
local one, according to which at an information set a player contemplates changing her choice
only there. If the deﬁnition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Deﬁnition 10 below) is modiﬁed
by imposing the strictly local deﬁnition of sequential rationality, then an extra condition needs
to be added to Deﬁnition 8, namely the "pre-consistency" condition on   identiﬁed in [6] and
[14] as being necessary and suﬃcient for the equivalence of the two notions. For simplicity we
have chosen the weakly local deﬁnition.
14Proposition 12 If (σ, ) is a sequential equilibrium then it is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Note that not every perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium
(this can be shown with the aid of the extensive form of Figure 3). Thus
sequential equilibrium is a strict reﬁnement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Kreps and Wilson [8] proved that every ﬁnite extensive-form game has at
least one sequential equilibrium. From this existence result and Proposition 12
one thus obtains the following.
Corollary 13 Every ﬁnite extensive-form game has at least one perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
Due to space limitations we leave to a companion paper ([4]) the epistemic justi-
ﬁcation of AGM-consistency (and thus of perfect Bayesian equilibrium) based on
the AGM theory of belief revision ([1]) as well as a more in-depth investigation
of the relationship between AGM-consistency and KW-consistency (and thus
between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium). In particu-
lar, the notion of AGM-consistency does not rule out correlation in a player’s
beliefs about the choices of her opponents, while KW-consistency has several in-
dependence properties built into it. Some of these independence properties can
be expressed in purely qualitative terms (that is, as properties of the underly-
ing plausibility order) and used to reﬁne the notion of AGM-consistency and
thus of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. A simple characterization of the backward-
induction solution(s) in perfect information games in terms of AGM-consistency
can also be obtained.
A Appendix
Although Proposition 7 follows easily from a result in Kreps and Wilson ([8],
Lemma A.1, p. 887) we provide a proof for completeness. First some preliminary
deﬁnitions and lemmas.
Remark 14 Recall our assumption that A =
 
h∈D A(h). Thus, for every a ∈
A there is an h ∈ D such that a ∈ A(h). Recall also the assumption that no
action is available at more than one information set, that is, if h,h′ ∈ H are
such that A(h) ∩ A(h′)  = ∅ then h′ ∈ I(h).
Notation 15 For every h ∈ H and a ∈ A we write a ∈ h if there exists an
h′ ∈ H such that h′a is a preﬁx of h (thus a ∈ A(h′)); that is, if a is an action
that occurs in history h.
Deﬁnition 16 An A-weighting is a function λ : A → N such that, for every
h ∈ D, there is at least one a ∈ A(h) with λ(a) = 0. Furthermore, if the null
history ∅ is assigned to chance, then λ(a) = 0 for every a ∈ A(∅).
15Lemma 17 Let ￿ be a choice measurable plausibility order. Let F : H → N
be a integer-valued representation that satisﬁes Property CM of Deﬁnition 6.
Deﬁne λ￿ : A → N as follows: λ￿(a) = F(ha) − F(h) for some h such that
a ∈ A(h). Then
(i) λ￿ is an A-weighting;
(ii) if Λ￿ : H → N is deﬁned by Λ￿(∅) = 0 and, for h ∈ H\{∅}, Λ￿(h) =  
a∈h λ￿(a) then, for every h ∈ H, Λ￿(h) = F(h).
Proof. (i) First of all, λ￿ is well deﬁned since if h and h′ are such that a ∈
A(h) ∩ A(h′) then, by Remark 14, h′ ∈ I(h)17 and thus, Property CM of
Deﬁnition 6, F(ha) − F(h) = F(h′a) − F(h′). By Property 1 of Deﬁnition 3,
F(ha) ≥ F(h) and thus, since F is integer-valued, λ￿(a) ∈ N. By Property 2
of Deﬁnition 3, for every h ∈ D there is an a ∈ A(h) such that ha ∼ h and thus
F(ha) = F(h) so that λ￿(a) = 0.
(ii) Fix an arbitrary h ∈ H. If h = ∅ then Λ￿(∅) = F(∅) = 0. If h =
 ∅,a1,...,am  (m ≥ 1), then Λ￿(h) = [F(∅a1) − F(∅)]
      
=λ￿ (a1)
+ [F(∅a1a2) − F(∅a1)]
      
=λ￿ (a2)
+
... + [F(h) − F(∅a1a2...am−1)]
      
=λ￿ (am)
= −F(∅) + F(h) = F(h) (since F(∅) = 0).
The following result is proved in Kreps and Wilson ([8], Lemma A.1, p. 887;
we have re-written the result in terms of the notation used in this paper and
slightly reworded it).
Lemma 18 Fix an extensive form.
(a) If (σ, ) is a KW-consistent assessment then there exists an A-weighting
λ : A → N such that, ∀h ∈ D,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) λ(a) = 0 if and only if σ(a) > 0,
and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for all h′ ∈ I(h) (where Λ(h) =  
a∈h λ(a)).
(b) If λ : A → N is an A-weighting, then there exists a KW-consistent
assessment (σ, ) such that, ∀h ∈ D,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) σ(a) > 0 if and only if
λ(a) = 0 and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for all h′ ∈ I(h).
Proof of Proposition 7. (1) Let (σ, ) be a KW-consistent assessment.
By (a) of Lemma 18 there exists an A-weighting λ : A → N such that, ∀h ∈
D,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) λ(a) = 0 if and only if σ(a) > 0, and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if
Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for all h′ ∈ I(h). Deﬁne the following total pre-order on the set of
histories H: h ￿ h′ if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′). Then ￿ is a plausibility order. In
fact, if h ∈ D and a ∈ A(h) then Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) ≥ Λ(h) (since λ(a) ≥ 0),
so that h ￿ ha. Furthermore, by deﬁnition of A-weighting, for every h ∈ D
there is an a ∈ A(h) such that λ(a) = 0 and thus Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) = Λ(h),
so that ha ￿ h. It is also clear that ￿ is choice measurable (the function Λ
17Without the assumption that no action is available at more than one information set, the
domain of the weigthing function λ would have to be the set of action-history pairs (a,h) with
a ∈ A(h). This would make the notation more complicated, but the proofs would go through.
16provides an integer-valued representation of ￿ that satisﬁes Property CM of
Deﬁnition 6) and that ￿ rationalizes (σ, ) (Deﬁnition 5).
(2) Let ￿ be a choice measurable plausibility order on the set of histories
H. By Lemma 17 one can derive from ￿ an A-weighting λ￿ : A → N such that
the associated function Λ￿ : H → N deﬁned by Λ￿(h) =
 
a∈h λ￿(a) is such
that h ￿ h′ if and only if Λ￿(h) ≤ Λ￿(h′). Thus, by (b) of Lemma 18, there
exists a consistent assessment (σ, ) such that, ∀h ∈ D,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) σ(a) > 0
if and only if λ(a) = 0 (hence if and only if h ∼ ha) and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and
only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) (hence if and only if h ￿ h′) for all h′ ∈ I(h). Thus (σ, )
is rationalized by ￿.
Before we prove Proposition 11 we need to give a precise deﬁnition of sub-










is a subgame of G with root h0 if: (1) I(h0) = {h0} (that is, the information
set that contains h0 consists of h0 only), (2) H′ = {h ∈ H : h0 is a preﬁx
of h} (that is, H′ is the subset of H consisting of histories that have h0 as a
preﬁx), (3) ∀h′ ∈ H′, ∀i ∈ N, ∀h ∈ H, if h ≈i h′ then h ∈ H′ (that is, the
information sets of G that contain an element of H′ are entirely included in
H′), (4) A′ = {a ∈ A : a ∈ A(h′) for some h′ ∈ H′} (that is, A′ is the sub-
set of A consisting of those actions that are available at histories in H′), (5)
N′ = {i ∈ N : P−1(i) ⊆ H′} (that is, N′ is the subset of players that are
assigned to histories in H′), (6) P′ is the restriction of P to H′ and (7) ∀i ∈ N′,
≈′
i is the restriction of ≈i to H′.
Let G be a game and σ a proﬁle of behavior strategies. Then σ is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of G if, for every subgame G′ of G, the restriction of σ to G′
is a Nash equilibrium of G′.
Next we introduce some notation. Fix a game G and a proﬁle of behavior
strategies σ. Let h,h′ ∈ H with h′ a preﬁx of h, that is, h = h′a1...am for
some actions a1,...,am ∈ A. Deﬁne Qh′,σ(h) = σ(a1) × ... × σ(am) (that
is, Qh′,σ(h) is the probability of reaching h from h′ if play is according to σ)
and let Qh′,σ(I(h)) =
 
x∈I(h)
Qh′,σ(x) be the probability of reaching, from h′, the
information set to which h belongs if play is according to σ. An assessment (σ, )
is weakly consistent if for every history h, whenever the probability of reaching
- from the null history (that is, from the root of the tree) - the information set
to which h belongs is positive (that is, if Q∅,σ(I(h)) > 0) then  (h) is obtained
from Q∅,σ( ) by using Bayes’ rule, that is,




The following result is well-known (see, for example, [11] p. 329).
Lemma 19 Fix an extensive-form game G and an assessment (σ, ). If (σ, )
is weakly consistent and sequentially rational, then σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 11 . Fix an extensive-form game G and let (σ, )
be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Then (σ, ) is Bayesian AGM-consistent.
17Let ￿ be a plausibility order on the set of histories H that rationalizes (σ, )
(see Deﬁnition 5) and relative to which ￿ is Bayesian (see Deﬁnition 8). Let G′
be an arbitrary subgame of G and let (σ′, ′) be the restriction of (σ, ) to G′.
We need to show that σ′ is a Nash equilibrium of G′. By deﬁnition of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, (σ, ) is sequentially rational in G and thus (σ′, ′) is
sequentially rational in G′. Hence, by Lemma 19, it is suﬃcient to show that
(σ′, ′) is weakly consistent in G′, that is, if h0 is the root of G′, then for every
h′ ∈ H′,18




Fix an arbitrary h′ ∈ H′ and suppose that Qh0,σ(I(h′)) > 0, that is, the infor-
mation set to which h′ belongs is reached with positive probability if σ is played
starting from h0. Then there is an h ∈ I(h′) such that h = h0a1...am for some
actions a1,...,am and σ(aj) > 0 for all j = 1,...,m.19 Thus, by Property P1 of
Deﬁnition 5 every action aj is plausibility preserving (see Remark 4) and hence,
by transitivity of ￿,
h0 ∼ h. (5)
Since every history in H′ has h0 as a preﬁx, by Remark 4 h0 ￿ x for every
x ∈ H′. It follows from this and (5) that h ∈ Min￿I(h′). Let E be the
￿-equivalence class to which h belongs (thus E contains Min￿I(h′)). By (5)
h0 ∈ E and by Deﬁnition 8 there is a probability measure νE on H (whose














Fix an arbitrary x ∈ I(h′). If x / ∈ E, then νE(x) = 0; furthermore, h ≺ x so
that, by (5), h0 ≺ x. It follows from this that x = h0b1...br for some actions
b1,...,br at least one of which - say bj - is not plausibility preserving. Hence,
by Property P1 of Deﬁnition 5, σ(bj) = 0 and thus Qh0,σ(x) = 0. Hence if
x / ∈ E then νE(x) = Qh0,σ(x) = 0. Now consider the case where x ∈ E,
that is, x ∼ h so that, by (5), x ∼ h0. Hence, x = h0b1...bs where, for every
k = 1,...,s, bk is a plausibility preserving action so that, by Property P1 of
Deﬁnition 5, σ(bk) > 0, for every k = 1,...,s. Thus, by Property (ii) of Deﬁnition
8, νE(x) = νE(h0)×(σ(b1) × ... × σ(bs)) = νE(h0)×Qh0,σ(x). It follows from













18Note that - since σ′ is the restriction of σ to G′ - for every h′ ∈ H′, Qh0,σ(h′) = Qh0,σ′(h′).
19Since σ′ is the restriction of σ to the subgame G′, σ′(aj) = σ(aj) for all j = 1,...,m.
20The probability of reaching h from h0, if play is according to σ, is Qh0,σ(h) = σ(a1) ×
... × σ(am).
18Hence the restriction of (σ, ) to the subgame G′ with root h0 is weakly consis-
tent in G′ and thus, by Lemma 19, σ′ is a Nash equilibrium of G′.
In order to prove Proposition 12 we need some preliminary deﬁnitions and
lemmas.
Deﬁnition 20 Fix an extensive-form game. Let (σ, ) be an assessment and ￿
a plausibility order on the set of histories H that rationalizes (σ, ). Let E ⊆ H
be an ￿-equivalence class. A path in E is a sequence  h1,...,hm  in E such that,
for every i = 1,...,m−1, either hi is a preﬁx of hi+1 or hi+1 is a preﬁx of hi or
hi+1 ∈ I(hi). We say that h,h′ ∈ E are linked if there exists a path  h1,...,hm 
in E with h1 = h and hm = h′. A subset F ⊆ E is connected if every pair in
F is linked. A subset F ⊆ E is maximally connected if it is connected and, for
every connected G ⊆ E, if F ⊆ G then F = G.
For example, consider the (partial) extensive form of Figure 6 and a plausibil-
ity order ￿ for which the following is an equivalence class: E = {a,b,c,d,em,en,bf,cg}.
Then histories a and d are linked by the path  a,b,bf,cg,c,d  (b ∈ I(a), b is
a preﬁx of bf, cg ∈ I(bf), c is a preﬁx of cg and d ∈ I(c)), while histories a
and em are not linked; furthemore, the maximally connected subsets of E are













Illustration of Deﬁnition 20
Figure 6
Lemma 21 Let ￿ be a plausibility order on H and E an ￿-equivalence class.
If F and G are two maximally connected subsets of E then either F = G or
F ∩ G = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that F and G are two maximally connected subsets of E with
F  = G and F ∩ G  = ∅. Fix an arbitrary h ∈ F ∩ G and arbitrary h1 ∈ F and
h2 ∈ G. Then there is a path from h1 to h and there is a path from h to h2.
Joining these two paths we get that h1 is linked to h2. Thus every two histories
in F ∪ G are linked and therefore F ∪ G is connected. Since F  = G, F ∪ G is
a proper superset of either F or G, contradicting the hypothesis that F and G
are maximally connected.
19Corollary 22 Let ￿ be a plausibility order on H and E an ￿-equivalence class.
Then E can be partitioned into a collection of maximally connected subsets .
Corollary 22 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 21 and ﬁniteness of H.
Lemma 23 Fix an extensive-form game. Let (σ, ) be an assessment and ￿ a
plausibility order on the set of histories H that rationalizes (σ, ). Let E ⊆ H
be an ￿-equivalence class and F a maximally connected subset of E (Deﬁnition
20). Let ν : H → [0,1] be a probability measure such that
(i) Supp(ν) ∩ F  = ∅,
(ii) if h,h′ ∈ F and h′ = ha1...ar (that is, h′ is a preﬁx of h) then ν(h′) =
ν(h) × σ(a1) × ... × σ(ar),
(iii) for every h ∈ F if ν(I(h)) > 0 then  (h) =
ν(h)
ν(I(h)).
Then, for all h ∈ F, ν(h) > 0, h ∈ Min￿I(h) and  (h) =
ν(h)
ν(I(h)) > 0.
Proof. Fix an h1 ∈ F such that ν(h1) > 0 (it exists by hypothesis (i)); then,
since h1 ∈ I(h1), ν(I(h1)) > 0 so that, by hypothesis (iii),  (h1) =
ν(h1)
ν(I(h1)).
Hence  (h1) > 0 and therefore, by Deﬁnition 5 (since (σ, ) is rationalized by ￿),
h1 ∈ Min￿I(h1). Fix an arbitrary h ∈ F. Then there is a path  h1,h2,...,hm 
in F with hm = h. First we show that ν(h2) > 0 and h2 ∈ Min￿I(h2). If h1
is a preﬁx of h2 then h2 = h1a1...ar for some actions a1,...,ar. By hypothesis
h1 and h2 belong to the same equivalence class, that is, h1 ∼ h2 and therefore
every action aj (j = 1,...,r) is plausibility preserving (see Remark 4) so that,
by Deﬁnition 5, σ(aj) > 0, for all j = 1,...,r. By hypothesis (ii), ν(h2) =
ν(h1) × σ(a1) × ... × σ(ar). Thus ν(h2) > 0 and, therefore, ν(I(h2)) > 0.
Hence, by hypothesis (iii),  (h2) =
ν(h2)
ν((I(h2)). Thus  (h2) > 0 and, therefore,
by Deﬁnition 5, h2 ∈ Min￿I(h2). The proof for the case where h2 is a preﬁx
of h1 is similar. If h2 ∈ I(h1) then, since h1 ∈ Min￿I(h1) and h2 ∼ h1, it
follows that h2 ∈ Min￿I(h1) = Min￿I(h2) (since I(h1) = I(h2)) and thus, by
Deﬁnition 5,  (h2) > 0. Since ν(I(h1)) > 0 (and I(h1) = I(h2)), by hypothesis
(iii),  (h2) =
ν(h2)
ν(I(h2)). Hence (since  (h2) > 0)
ν(h2)
ν(I(h2)) > 0 and thus ν(h2) > 0.
The proof can now be completed by induction by showing (for k = 2,...,m−1,
using the same argument) that if hk is such that ν(hk) > 0 then ν(hk+1) > 0
and hk+1 ∈ Min￿I(hk+1).
Proof of Proposition 12. Fix an extensive-form game and let (σ, ) be a
sequential equilibrium, that is, (σ, ) is sequentially rational and KW-consistent.
By Proposition 7, KW-consistency implies AGM-consistency. Thus we only need
to show that (σ, ) is Bayesian relative to some plausibility order that rational-
izes ￿. Let ￿ be the plausibility order described in the proof of Proposition 7
(obtained from an A-weighting, whose existence is guaranteed by (a) of Lemma
18). Fix an arbitrary history ˜ h ∈ H and let Min￿I(˜ h) be the set of most plau-
sible histories in I(˜ h) (thus, for every h ∈ I(˜ h),  (h) > 0 if h ∈ Min￿I(˜ h) and
 (h) = 0 otherwise). Let E be the ￿-equivalence class that contains Min￿I(˜ h).
Thus if h,h′ ∈ E are such that h′ = ha1...am then σ(aj) > 0 for all j = 1,...,m.
20We need to show that there is a probability measure νE on H that satisﬁes





of completely mixed behavior-strategy proﬁles such
that (1) limm→∞ σm = σ and (2) for every h ∈ H, limm→∞  m(h) =  (h)
where  m(h) is the conditional probability of h given I(h) obtained by Bayes’
rule from σm, that is,  m(h) =
Q∅,σm(h)  
x∈I(h)
Q∅,σm(x). To simplify the notation de-
note Q∅,σm(h) by νm(h). Let F be the maximally connected subset of E that









νm(y) if h ∈ F (8)
First we show that νF satisﬁes the properties of Lemma 23. Property (i) is
clearly satisﬁed, since the support of ν is a subset of F. Fix arbitrary h,h′ ∈ F











νm(y)×limm→∞ (σm(a1) × ... × σm(ar)) = νF(h)×σ(a1)×...× σ(ar),
so that Property (ii) is also satisﬁed. Fix an arbitrary h ∈ F such that  
x∈I(h)
















































νm(x) = limm→∞  m(h) =  (h).
(9)
21Note that, since σm is completely mixed, 0 < νm(h) < 1 for every h ∈ H and thus, for
every F ⊆ H and every h ∈ F, 0 <
νm(h)  
y∈F












has a convergent subsequence. Thus, if necessary,




21Thus Property (iii) of Lemma 23 is also satisﬁed. Hence, by Lemma 23, for
every h ∈ F, νF(h) > 0 and  (h) =
ν(h)
ν(I(h)) > 0.22 If F = E then the proof of
Proposition 12 is complete. If F is a proper subset of E, then, by Corollary 22, E
can be partitioned into a collection of maximally connected subsets {G1,...,Gm}
one of which is F. For every Gj (j = 1,...,m) repeat the same argument as
for F and obtain a probability measure vGj on Gj such that vGj(h) > 0 for all
h ∈ Gj and that satiﬁes the properties of Lemma 23. Let α1,...,αm be arbitrary
numbers such that 0 < aj < 1, for all j = 1,...,m, and
 m
j=1 aj = 1 and let
νE : H → [0,1] be deﬁned by νE(h) =
 m
j=1 ajvGj(h). Then νE satisﬁes the
properties of Deﬁnition 8 and thus (σ, ) is Bayesian relative to ￿.
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